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by Cabray L. Haines, former senior associate economist, and Calvin T. Ho, associate economist
Although banking across national borders has expanded rapidly, banking regulation remains
nationally based. As a result, governments and financial institutions face significant challenges
when instability arises. At the Chicago Fed’s International Banking Conference, participants
explored cross-border banking issues and ways to improve the current system.
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As financial consolidation and interna-
tional trade have continued to expand
in recent years, so too has cross-border
banking: International banks based in
one (home) country are becoming more
deeply embedded in the banking activi-
ties of other (host) countries. However,
supervision and regulation of these insti-
tutions remain, for the most part, nation-
ally based. This can create problems when
international banks experience finan-
cial difficulties. On October 5–6, 2006,
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
in conjunction with the International
Association of Deposit Insurers, held
its ninth annual International Banking
Conference, titled “International Finan-
cial Instability: Global Banking and
National Regulation.” The conference
brought together academics, policy-
makers, regulators, and bankers from
more than 40 countries to explore these
issues and to discuss how they might be
addressed before a crisis event occurs.
International banking and financial
crises
The first speaker, Dirk Schoenmaker,
Ministry of Finance, Netherlands, dis-
cussed the degree of bank internation-
alization in the Americas, Europe, and
the Asia-Pacific region. He divided com-
mercial bank activity into three categories
based on where it takes place: the home
country, the greater region, or the rest
of the world. He found that European
banks are substantially less domestically
concentrated than are North American
and Asia-Pacific banks. Asia-Pacific banks
were the most domestically focused, with
some 86% of their business derived from
home. Despite internationalization in
banking, Schoenmaker concluded that
very few banks could actually be con-
sidered “global” rather than national
or regional.
Carl-Johan Lindgren, formerly with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
gave an overview of past cross-border
banking and financial crises. He said
he was surprised to find that among
nearly 200 financial crises over the
past 30 years, very few could actually
be classified as “cross-border”—that is,
national financial crises that were sub-
stantial enough to cause crises elsewhere.
Moreover, the five cases he did identify,
including Mexico in 1994 and Asia in
1997, primarily evolved from unsus-
tainable macroeconomic policies, and
they spread because of shifts in percep-
tions about stability in the countries
rather than direct contagion through
the banking system.
Central banks have begun to analyze
financial stability in their own countries
in an increasingly public way, accord-
ing to Sander Oosterloo, Ministry of
Finance, Netherlands. The number of
central banks publishing financial stabil-
ity reviews has increased sharply in theThanks to efforts to harmonize different countries’ regulatory
frameworks, there has been significant convergence in core
concepts. The task today, however, is to hammer out and
organize actual rules.
last decade, with the goals of promoting
financial stability, increasing transparen-
cy, and strengthening interagency cooper-
ation. However, Oosterloo’s research did
not find a relationship between this trans-
parency and actual financial stability.
Cross-border instability
Bent Vale, Bank of Norway, offered in-
sight into the links through which cross-
border banking instability might spread.
He noted that these “contagion links”
were mostly hypothetical, since crises
transmitted directly through banking
channels have been few. Vale distin-
guished between crises taking root in
an international bank with a branch
structure (one legal entity headquartered
in a home country) versus a subsidiary
structure (different legal entities in
different countries). For example, prob-
lems in a parent bank in one country
might lead to curbs on its lending ac-
tivity. In a branch structure, these curbs
might be systemwide, causing the prob-
lem to spread to other countries, where-
as with a subsidiary structure, the lending
curbs would be chiefly confined to the
parent, reducing potential contagion.
Jon Danielsson, London School of
Economics, discussed cross-border cur-
rency crises. He described the results of
preliminary research into the relevance
of trading volume to these crises. For one,
he noted that currency trading volumes
in different countries generally tend to
move together, but this relationship weak-
ens during a crisis. Moreover, countries
that are close together do not necessarily
show volume moves together, providing
evidence of speculative trading.
Triphon Phumiwasana, Milken Institute,
summarized data on hedge funds that
he and his colleagues have collected in
order to probe funds’ roles in global
financial risk. Data on the industry are
hard to come by, making risk assessments
difficult, but Phumiwasana was able to
highlight some key points: There has
been dramatic growth in the number of
hedge funds in recent years; the average
hedge fund has increased in size; and
about 50% of hedge fund assets are cat-
egorized as “global” or scattered around
the world. Also, he emphasized that
hedge funds do not necessarily “hedge,”
but rather pursue diverse high-risk strat-
egies with the goal of high returns. Un-
fortunately, gauges of their performance
are incomplete, since funds come and go
frequently and leave a limited data trail.
Supervision across borders
Richard Herring, University of Pennsyl-
vania, guided conference participants
through the tangled history of interna-
tional banking supervision. The basic
desire to ensure cross-border financial
stability and to level the playing field
between countries led to the first effort
to coordinate supervision, the Basel
Concordat of 1975. While the accord was
an important step in terms of coordina-
tion and communication, persistent gaps
fueled additional agreements through
the years, eventually leading to today’s
Basel II principles. According to Herring,
thanks to “enormous” efforts to har-
monize different countries’ regulatory
frameworks, there has been significant
convergence in core concepts. The task
today, however, is to hammer out and
organize actual rules.
Paul Wright, Financial Services Authority,
United Kingdom, spoke about nonbank
supervision across borders. After all, as
the IMF’s Raghuram Rajan noted in his
luncheon speech, a tremendous amount
of financial sector value (and risk) exists
outside the banking system. Wright enu-
merated some of the risks that broker-
dealers, reinsurance firms, and hedge
funds pose to financial stability. As all of
these entities are global in scope, they de-
mand collaboration between authorities,
even if complete mutual reliance is unlike-
ly, he said. For example, a host country
should feel comfortable relying on a home
country supervisor when a firm has rela-
tively low impact in the host nation. On
the other hand, the home and host may
want to focus more on collaboration rath-
er than reliance in cases where the firm
has a high impact in the host country.
The ultimate barrier to mutual reliance
and trust, he said, is political appetite:
When a firm fails, the regulator must be
willing to justify to elected leaders the
decision to rely on another country’s
supervisory capabilities.
In prepared keynote remarks delivered in
absentia, Stefan Ingves, Bank of Sweden,
offered a summary of the overall chal-
lenges that cross-border supervision and
regulation face. First, information shar-
ing is difficult, particularly if a bank con-
centrates certain functions in certain
countries. Second, conflicts of interest
abound. Third, supervisors’ assessments
of the issues may be colored by national
interests. Finally, simply coordinating
decisions is problematic, since in a crisis,
information is limited and actions must
be swift. To begin coping with these
challenges in Europe, Ingves suggested
that a pan-European body should be es-
tablished to help supervise major cross-
border banks and lay a foundation for a
European authority.
The government safety net
A key issue in cross-border banking reg-
ulation has to do with who takes respon-
sibility when transnational banks run into
trouble. What country or entity should
provide liquidity in a time of crisis—in
other words, who should function as a
lender of last resort (LOLR)? Also, where
can depositors turn when international
banks fail? Vitor Gaspar, Bank of Portugal,
argued that in Europe, the basic oper-
ational framework of monetary policy
already provides an effective automatic
LOLR structure. He contended that the
European Central Bank’s (ECB) marginal
lending facility, which provides a ceiling
interest rate for unlimited borrowing from
the ECB, satisfies the principles of the
classical LOLR doctrine. For one, the facil-
ity clearly supports overall systemic sta-
bility and monetary policy objectives.Michael H. Moskow, President; Charles L. Evans,
Senior Vice President and Director of Research;  Douglas
Evanoff, Vice President, financial studies; Jonas Fisher,
Economic Advisor and Team Leader, macroeconomic
policy research; Richard Porter, Vice President, payment
studies; Daniel Sullivan, Vice President, microeconomic
policy research;  William Testa, Vice President, regional
programs and Economics Editor; Helen O’D. Koshy,
Kathryn Moran, and Han Y. Choi, Editors; Rita
Molloy and Julia Baker, Production Editors.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. The views expressed are the
authors’ and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System.
© 2007 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Chicago Fed Letter articles may be reproduced in
whole or in part, provided the articles are not
reproduced or distributed for commercial gain
and provided the source is appropriately credited.
Prior written permission must be obtained for
any other reproduction, distribution, republica-
tion, or creation of derivative works of Chicago Fed
Letter articles. To request permission, please contact
Helen Koshy, senior editor, at 312-322-5830 or
email Helen.Koshy@chi.frb.org. Chicago Fed
Letter and other Bank publications are available
on the Bank’s website at www.chicagofed.org.
ISSN 0895-0164
In addition, it helps banks absorb liquidity
shocks but requires good collateral and
lends at “penalty” rates. Finally, the rules
governing the marginal lending facility
are well understood. As a result, Gaspar
asserted that emergency assistance to
individual institutions is unlikely to be
an important issue in practice, despite
provisions that allow for it.
Michael Krimminger, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), noted
that issues of cross-border deposit insur-
ance rarely matter until a crisis occurs.
When an international bank runs into
trouble, the patchwork of national insol-
vency laws is ill-equipped to restructure
the institution and continue critical pay-
ments in a reasonable time frame. Various
national deposit insurance programs
differ in the types of accounts that are
covered, maximum limits of coverage,
funding mechanisms, government guar-
antees, and payment speed. Perhaps most
importantly, the flexibility of the laws
varies, meaning that regulators often by-
pass the system during a crisis and bail
out the institution with government funds.
This creates issues of moral hazard with
potentially significant economic costs.
To deal with future crises, Krimminger
urged deposit insurers to map out com-
parisons between programs. With global
deposit insurance an unlikely scenario
at this point, regulators should focus on
understanding the areas of conflict and
the opportunities for cooperation be-
tween their national programs. Separately,
FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair echoed
this sentiment in her keynote remarks,
encouraging the sharing of expertise
between deposit insurance bodies, so
that crisis management can proceed
more smoothly and efficiently.
Many presenters highlighted a thorny
asymmetry that results from cross-border
banking: An international bank branch
or subsidiary may be relatively large for
the host country, but small for the par-
ent bank and home country supervisor,
and vice versa. Andrew Powell, Inter-
American Development Bank, and
Giovanni Majnoni, World Bank, argued
that it might be useful to think of an in-
ternational bank in terms of a fully guar-
anteed “core,” which survives or fails as
one, and a “periphery,” for which the
bank limits its responsibility to the capi-
tal it has invested. They conceptualized
the solvency of the bank in terms of a
portfolio of forward contracts (the core),
which can produce profits or losses, and
call options (the periphery), in which
losses are limited. Powell and Majnoni
concluded that with locally based deposit
insurance, international banks have an
incentive to relegate riskier subsidiaries’
activities to the periphery—that is, to
limit the parents’ guarantees—and devote
minimal capital to them. Unfortunately
for the host country, this implies that the
international parent would walk away
from the subsidiary in a crisis situation,
but Powell asserted that host deposit insur-
ers can play a role in shifting this balance
because of their power to set rates.
Insolvency resolution
Although the causes of cross-border
banking and financial crises are not yet
fully known, the negative effects are
clear. Liquidity problems, settlement and
clearing issues, and disruptions to hedge
contracts are only a few of the difficul-
ties that can result from these situations.
Robert Eisenbeis, Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta, argued that regulatory struc-
tures can actually add to the negative ex-
ternalities. Specifically, Eisenbeis focused
on bankruptcy laws. The longer the bank-
ruptcy process, the longer depositors
have to wait for access to funds, and po-
tentially the deeper the crisis. This state
of affairs is compounded in cross-border
scenarios in which bankruptcy laws differ
between countries. Eisenbeis contended
that regulators should focus on institut-
ing and streamlining bank-specific bank-
ruptcy laws to limit the duration of credit
and liquidity problems.
Rosa Maria Lastra, University of London,
also lamented the lack of coherence in
bank insolvency regimes. Like Eisenbeis,
she voiced support for a bank-specific
insolvency regime instead of European-
style schemes in which banks are treated
like other corporations. Because banks
play a unique role in the economy and
bank crisis management involves unique
instruments (e.g., deposit insurance and
the LOLR), banks remain “special,” Lastra
contended. Nonetheless, she did not ad-
vocate the creation of an international
authority or world bankruptcy court.
Instead, Lastra argued for a more fully
defined set of common international
rules and procedures. These rules might
not have the force of formal law, she ad-
mitted, but they could facilitate mutual
trust across borders, which is critical for
greater harmonization and efficiency.
David Mayes, Bank of Finland, discussed
some of the issues involved when a sys-
temically important institution fails.
Specifically, he enumerated a set of re-
quirements for effectively managing the
failure of such an entity. First, the au-
thorities must be able to act quickly
based on a predetermined trigger event.
Next, the institution’s resources should
be allocated in a way that respects the
hierarchy that would have prevailed in an
insolvency proceeding, but without con-
tributing to moral hazard. Finally, the
regime needs to ensure equitable treat-
ment of all institutions. Mayes proposed
that only a separate agency, not responsi-
ble for keeping banks open, should han-
dle systemic bank problems. However, the
legal framework for this necessary inter-
vention does not exist in many countries.
Early intervention
Larry Wall, Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, outlined the notion of “promptcorrective action” (PCA), a system
adopted in the U.S. that is designed to
minimize deposit insurance losses by
mandating early supervisory interven-
tion at troubled banks. Lawmakers and
regulators must accept a few key con-
cepts in order for PCA to be effective,
he said. For one, limits must be placed
on supervisors’ discretion; unless they
are required to act early, supervisors may
wait out problems and hope they correct
themselves. Also, it must be accepted
that banks will be closed even at positive
levels of regulatory capital. Wall then
described the institutional requirements
for effective PCA: supervisory indepen-
dence, but with accountability; adequate
supervisory powers, such as the ability
to withdraw licenses; sound resolution
procedures that inspire confidence; and
reasonable, timely financial information.
With these measures in place, PCA can
help minimize the economic and finan-
cial costs of bank insolvency. However,
most countries have a long way to go to
meet the conditions necessary for an
effective PCA strategy domestically, let
alone in cross-border situations.
For his part, Arnoud Boot, University
of Amsterdam, asserted that implement-
ing a PCA regime in Europe, though
difficult, might bring even more bene-
fits than it has in the U.S. Today, the
European system relies on national
authorities for supervision and LOLR
functions. Early intervention could fore-
stall the more intractable coordination
problems and conflicts of interest that
arise once a crisis occurs. However, Boot
cautioned that adopting a PCA regime
for banks may not be enough, since bank
deposits are less crucial for accessing
liquidity in today’s financial system.
Crisis prevention
The current cross-border supervisory
framework—multinational banks with
national supervision, and partial cross-
border harmonization with persistent
national differences—would likely run
into trouble in a crisis. According to
David Hoelscher, IMF, this makes it un-
sustainable. In order to prevent conta-
gion, he argued that the system will
likely evolve in one of two ways. First,
there might be significantly greater har-
monization of laws and regulations. Un-
fortunately, while the desire exists, the
political will to pursue this goal is rather
limited. Instead, Hoelscher believes that
host countries will assert increasingly
aggressive control over foreign branches
and subsidiaries, as has been the case in
New Zealand and Mexico. Although
multilateral and bilateral regimes can
try to contain this trend over time, host
countries have powerful incentives to
protect their own interests and exert
more control today.
David Mengle, International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
summarized efforts made by private
organizations such as his own to ensure
cross-border financial stability. In addition
to more formalized arrangements, includ-
ing the 1993 Group of 30 report, which
helped institutionalize risk-management
practices, the private sector also pursues
day-to-day practices that implicitly pro-
mote stability. For example, ISDA has
constructed a flexible master agreement
for derivative transactions that is widely
used. Such standardization promotes mar-
ket liquidity and legal certainty, which
in turn contribute to preventing crises.
The road ahead
J. P. Sabourin, International Association
of Deposit Insurers, concluded the con-
ference with a discussion of priorities for
cross-border regulation going forward.
First, he reminded participants that much
work remains to be done at the national
level. Safety net players within countries—
deposit insurers, bank supervisors, and
central banks—need to improve their
communication before cooperation can
extend across borders. Second, supervi-
sors in different countries need to agree
to and adhere to standards of minimum
regulatory capital before an international
system of PCA can take hold. Finally,
Sabourin repeated the sentiment that
substantive improvement of the system
requires the political will to act. He urged
all conference participants to help build
that political momentum—before a crisis
does it for them.